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ABSTRACT  
 
‘Organised crime’ is a term that sounds more coherent than it is, and carries with it major 
threat imagery which is useful for some purposes but counter-productive for others.  Some 
components are a threat to national security but most affect human security at a sub-national 
level. This article critically examines some economic, physical and perception features of the 
harms and threats, and discusses their implications for strategic and tactical interventions. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Organised crime is a curious concept. Ask English-speaking people in the street, and they are 
most likely to think of fictional representations in film or television – the Godfather, Goodfellas 
or The Sopranos (plus Underbelly if they are Australian). Other languages and cultures have 
their fictional equivalents. If the crimes and their apparent organisation do not fit this gestalt 
of cunning, trafficking and violence, then most would think that there was not a problem of 
‘organised crime’.  On the other hand, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime agreed in Palermo in 2000 sets a far lower standard for the label, to the extent that 
‘organised crime’ can be fulfilled by three burglars and a window cleaning service – a handy 
front for money laundering unless a banker or accountant wonders how feasible it really is for 
such a small outfit to earn £100,000 a year each when their costs are so modest.1 Although 
there may be nothing disorganised about their conduct, such a business is far from the popular 
or even the police image of organised crime: this is made all the more ironic when one thinks 
that, had Bernard Madoff acted alone or just with his brother in criminal intent, merely using 
the ‘unseeing’ services of his accountants and other staff in the global Ponzi scheme that has 
generated some $17.5 billion in losses, he would not have been an ‘organised criminal’ in the 
Palermo sense.2 The term ‘organised crime’ is therefore conceptually inadequate: this author 
has attempted to modify the lexicon by introducing the phrase ‘The Organisation of Serious 
Crimes for Gain’, which tries to capture the complexities better, just as the UK and Europol 
have made ‘serious’ an alternative or supplement to ‘organised’ as a basis for intervention.3 
Such attempts notwithstanding, however, ‘organised crime’ is not easily dispensed with as a 
term, not just because it is the antithesis of “opportunistic-individual” crime but also precisely 
because of its evocative connotations of interpersonal and social threat; and membership of a 
criminal organisation (however tricky to define operationally) triggers greater investigative 
powers and tougher sentences in many countries, particularly in the EU. This article seeks to 
tease out the nature and extent of harms associated with organised crime, and concludes with 
the implications for control. 
 
The question here is what it means to regard ‘organised crime’ as a human or national security 
threat. Military strategists are familiar with having to regard, say, Russia or the mujahedeen as 
an ally one moment and as potentially posing a threat the next. Although any crime could on 
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some level constitute a ‘threat’ to human security, there is something about ‘organised’ crime 
that increases the risk that it becomes a threat to national security. After all, counter-terrorism 
experts are familiar enough with the need to think of asymmetric threats and are well aware 
that networks, such as Al-Qa’ida, can be more difficult to combat than armies. One difference 
between organised crime and terrorism is that a small number of people (unless they are 
corporate executives) can seldom generate the economies of scale in crime for financial gain 
that parallels the devastation that a few terrorists (or even one ‘lone wolf’, vide Anders Breivik 
or Pavlo Lapshyn) can in undertaking a bomb attack or than someone without political goals, 
such as Derrick Bird, can in spree or serial killings. This applies whether one considers 
predatory crimes (like fraud and robbery, which have direct victims) or market crimes 
(supplying desired services such as drugs, sex and pornography, where those ‘supplied’ and 
those ‘using’ may or may not see themselves as victims). To assess plausible future threats 
from organised crime, we need to know what resources – both from ‘conscious opponents’4 
and from unknowing and/or wilfully blind intermediaries – are required and are likely to 
become available to enhance the capacity to raise substantially the level of harm. This may 
vary depending on the type of crime and the contextual support services available, which 
modern Information and Communications Technology and global financial services provision 
have brought ever nearer.   
 
However, the advent of modern ICT does not obliterate the existing criminal landscape. While 
Silk Road and such like illicit e-markets could become the criminal equivalent of Amazon or 
eBay, delivering by post or (when viewing is enough) by the web illicit pleasures and crime-
enabling products, it is doubtful that this could actually replace buying stolen gear or drugs 
from friends or neighbourhood dope peddlers, when drug taking is in many ways a collective, 
social activity. Also questionable is how likely ICT is to affect illicit migration, which requires 
clandestine services that are difficult to formalise, and are greatly influenced by trust and 
interpersonal relationships that cannot be taken for granted. Most predatory crimes require 
local relationships. Meanwhile, market offences usually involve the transnational transport of 
commodities or people, except in the cases of the production of illegal drugs, domestic 
trafficking of people and child exploitation, and local racketeering extortion. The significant 
movements of people across borders in recent decades, accelerating since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the expansion of the EU, has created more diasporas with easier cross-border 
networks of trust and extended family ‘pressure’, making the idea of ‘national’ organised crime 
rather outmoded, though traffickers and fraudsters still have to borrow others’ identities.5  
 
 
Costs, Harms and Threats 
When analysing and combating organised crime, one of the main difficulties is that it is seldom 
clear who or, indeed, what the ‘enemy’ is: whether the target is a broad range of acts (such as 
the full range of crimes that ‘organised criminals’ may be involved in committing) or (as in 
terrorism, properly construed) a particular set of actors who constitute a threat and their witting 
and unwitting facilitators. Unfortunately for analytical clarity, the scale of damage is not as 
obvious as in terrorism, nor is it always easy to know how much of that damage is caused by 
any particular set of actors. Hence the importance of thinking through the economic and social 
costs of crimes and the extent to which they are attributable to ‘organised crime’, however 
defined, to probe the plausibility of what is sometimes termed ‘shroud-waving’ on the part of 
those advocating greater resources. 
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Perceptions of Organised Crime 
Perceptions of threat are distinct from evidence about actual risks and costs, though (as with 
surveillance powers generally) perceptions are important to the legitimacy of powers and 
resources, and in themselves constitute social costs to a sense of wellbeing and security. For 
this reason it is fruitful to examine recent Scottish data on perceptions of organised crime.6 
Although not discussed by the report’s authors, it is intriguing that when asked which crimes 
they associate with ‘organised crime’, the three crimes highlighted by respondents were drugs 
(use and selling) (72 per cent), money laundering (20 per cent) and people trafficking (18 per 
cent). Only 8 per cent mentioned theft and robbery, and 11 per cent counterfeiting. Yet of the 
10 per cent who stated that they had been affected by organised crime in Scotland in the past 
three years, theft and burglary ranked relatively high, while drugs (12 per cent of those saying 
they had been affected) and credit and debit card fraud (8 per cent) were the only crimes that 
featured in the perceptions list above. Although over two-thirds did not consider it to be a 
serious problem in their neighbourhood, the majority of Scots (84 per cent) consider organised 
crime to be a serious issue ‘in Scotland’, with women (87 per cent), those aged over fifty-five 
(88 per cent) and those living in the most deprived areas (90 per cent) most likely to regard it 
as a problem. People believe the main impacts of organised crime in Scotland to be ‘fear in the 
community’ (21 per cent), ‘drugs/drug abuse’ (17 per cent) and – somewhat curiously – ‘less 
money being available for public services’ (12 per cent).7 So alongside other studies conducted 
in Northern Ireland,8 as well as in England and Wales,9 this survey suggests that the 
government and police have not convinced many of the public that organised crime affects 
them personally, though they may accept that, in abstract terms, organised crime is a threat to 
the nation. Perhaps this shows that where people do not see or believe that there is a highly 
organised Mafia (like in the movies), they find difficulty accepting that there is ‘organised 
crime’ where they live.   
 
 
Costs of Organised Crime 
It has become conventional to express all social issues through the common metric of money. 
However, while it is not always obvious what is achieved analytically by doing this, it is clear 
that judgments about priorities should be constrained by a reasoning process rather than being 
the products of whim. In principle, therefore having to assign a value – like ‘willingness to pay 
to prevent harm x’ – is one way of doing so. Crucial to this process, however, is the basis for 
assigning particular economic values to misconduct, and this is an area that would benefit from 
scholarly development. The risk is that one assigns a value which simply reflects the priority 
that one wishes the conduct to be given, in which case economic costs are largely a way of 
evading explicit value judgments about the harm that is actually caused.  
 
It is important to emphasise that estimating the costs and harms of particular issues is different 
from estimating what criminals make from crime and how much of those proceeds they are 
laundering. The harms from crime may be far greater than the benefits to offenders: toxic waste 
dumping, the financing and smuggling of WMD, and reckless ‘rogue trading’ in the hope of 
generating a profit or offsetting a loss are cases in point. Conversely, it is arguable that some 
crimes cause little net harm because, though prohibited, they are consensual: in such cases, the 
illicit gains may be greater than the social costs.10 Much crime – even as part of ‘organised 
crime activities’ – might better be described as ‘offend to spend’ rather than ‘offend to save 
and legitimise’.11 In short, estimates of the cost of organised crime and of laundering must be 
looked at with a sceptical eye and can even be counterproductive given that the gap between 
the proceeds of crime confiscation (worldwide, maximum $2 billion annually) and the 
estimated proceeds of crime, which is thought to be in the trillions or – more conservatively – 
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multi-billions of dollars. Realistically, such a gap cannot be bridged. The most pressing 
question, therefore, is what the practical implications of this gap are for strategies and tactics. 
 
Research in this field is still at an early stage and – as with eyewitness testimony – there is no 
correlation between confidence and accuracy of judgments. A recent study for the European 
Parliament identified minimum total costs of organised-crime activities in the European Union 
to be €126.3 billion; €1.2 billion for identified budget enforcement costs (excluding most 
national agencies); and €34 billion for costs related to drug treatment.12 It further noted that: 
 
In a number of areas, suitable data to prepare informed estimates of cost are lacking 
wholly, or in part, due to figures being produced via methodologies that render them 
unreliable. However, this does not mean that social harms cannot be identified, without 
producing eye-catching numbers that have little reasonable basis but attract attention to 
social problems. For example, there are the human costs of collapsed bridges, buildings 
and roads due to bad construction combined with corrupt construction contracts. The 
economic and social costs of these far exceed the profits made, to which we should add 
the social anxieties and the destruction of entrepreneurial drive that such criminal 
monopoly creates. 
There are at least two ways of defining ‘organised crime’…. The first is to focus on 
Mafia-type associations – the image that most graphically captures what many people 
think of when they use the term. The second is a looser set of networks with far less 
stability or hierarchy whose participants supply markets with illicit goods and services: 
this represents the reality of “organised crime” in most areas of most EU Member 
States. The Mafia-type associations have activities in MS outside their home countries, 
but we cannot easily identify a particular sets of costs attached to it, except in Italy and 
up to a point in Bulgaria. Therefore we have chosen to look primarily at the costs arising 
from the looser networked ‘organised crime’.  
 
Table 1:  Estimate of the Minimum Identifiable Direct Economic Costs of Selected Activities 
of Organised Crime in the EU in 2012. 
 
 
 
 
Organised-Crime Activities Direct Economic 
Cost  (€) 
Human trafficking 30 billion 
Fraud against EU (cigarette smuggling) 11.3 billion 
Fraud against EU (VAT/MTIC fraud) 20 billion 
Fraud against EU (agricultural and 
structural funds) 3 billion 
Fraud against EU individuals 97 billion 
Unrecovered motor vehicle theft 4.25 billion 
Payment card fraud 1.16 billion 
Insurance fraud 
1 billion (in UK 
alone).  Other EU 
countries’ 
insurance sectors 
do not collect these 
data 
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Table 1 shows the estimated direct economic costs of some organised-crime activities within 
the EU.  There are other areas of harm, however, that are more problematic to attribute to 
organised crime and to assess in economic terms. The social and economic costs of organised 
crime were estimated by a recent Home Office study at £24 billion for the UK: ‘drugs supply 
(£10.7 billion), organised fraud (£8.9 billion) and organised immigration crime types (£1.0 
billion) have major impacts on the UK, and other less visible crimes also cause substantial 
harm’.13 This study, like its predecessors, attributes all of the consequences of drug misuse to 
organised crime, implicitly on the grounds that without organised crime there would be little 
or no illegal drugs available.14 Thus, for example, deaths from illegal drug use and their 
economic consequences – notwithstanding the low economic productivity of many drug users 
– are attributed to organised crime. The European Parliament report – developed in parallel - 
rejects this general approach: the harms from illegal drug taking are significantly affected by 
how one treats the commodity and its suppliers and users, and the study deemed it a mistake to 
lump them all into the category of ‘organised crime costs’. Ironically, the recklessness of many 
drug suppliers is more likely to generate fatalities if successes in the reduction of supply lead 
to more inconsistent and toxic ‘cutting’ of products whose purity is not standardised. So 
although one could argue for the inclusion of accidental drug deaths in the costs of organised 
crime as ‘collateral damage’, no economically rational drug dealer would kill off his or her 
market of purchasers; and killing off criminal rivals attracts too much media and police ‘heat’ 
unless the group is strong enough to threaten or resist the state, as sometimes happens in Italy, 
some Southeast and East European countries, Mexico and several Central and South American 
countries.  
 
In fact, relatively small benefits to criminals may generate huge collateral damage, and those 
who argue that some aspects of drugs and other crime policies are iatrogenic would contend 
that the money that is spent or lost due to drug enforcement, imprisonment and post-prison loss 
of productivity (as a result of disadvantages in the job market) exceeds the harm that would 
result if drugs were consumed in a more regulated market.15 Indeed, they would argue this even 
though many people who take drugs have other addiction, crime and health problems that are 
costly both to themselves and to society.  
 
Human trafficking is another area of organised-crime activity for which it is difficult to 
estimate the economic cost, level of social harm and threat to national security. The main legal 
differences between trafficking and smuggling are that migrants usually pay to be smuggled, 
but traffickers generate money from the ongoing exploitation of their victims, even when 
originally paid to smuggle them voluntarily. Smugglers only generate money from the 
movement and illegal entry phases, and smuggling must involve illegally crossing a border, 
whereas trafficking can also occur within a country. The tragic loss of lives off the coast of 
Lampedusa in 2013 – and accompanying evidence about the frequency of similar journeys and 
payments – has highlighted the huge market in smuggled people, for whom large investments 
in search of a better life or flight from an imperilled life constitute a rational choice. The costs 
and benefits of people smuggling accrue in different places: some may see harms to the UK 
labour market, for example, but businesspeople and illegal migrants may see this as enthusiastic 
and cheap labour. There would be a much smaller market for illegal emigration if those 
extended families who raised funds to pay the smugglers were not usually repaid by the 
migrants afterwards: otherwise it would be irrational for the families to invest such 
(proportionately vast) sums in their collective futures. Even many of those trafficked send some 
funds back to their families. It is unknown whether the better communication of risks to people 
living in developing countries would have much impact – an aspect that remains 
underexplored. 
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Human trafficking is a different matter, as it can entail rape and slavery (often after voluntary 
migration), and its socio-economic costs have been estimated to be high in all studies.16 
However, the very real issues inherent in people trafficking notwithstanding, it is not clear in 
what sense the 1,186 victims who were referred to the authorities in 2012 (an increase from the 
946 victims in 2011) constitute a national security threat to the UK, as opposed to a human 
security threat to those badly exploited individuals. People who illicitly find their way into the 
country from overseas with the initial or later-developed intent to do serious harm to people or 
infrastructure may be national security threats, but such individuals are more likely to have 
been voluntarily smuggled than to have been trafficked against their will. Nor is this threat 
component conceptually clarified by the otherwise thoughtful inter-departmental ministerial 
report released in 2013 by the UK government, which correctly notes that many of those 
suspected of human-trafficking cases are prosecuted for other offences (in which respect it 
resembles money laundering). The apparent rise in numbers of persons defined as ‘trafficked’ 
may reflect more active identification efforts rather than a real rise in trafficking or the related 
‘threat’. Much of the human-trafficking debate is over highly contested estimates – especially 
over the numbers of people trafficked to various parts of the world – which have become a 
political football between NGOs, religious groups and other interested parties.17  
 
It must also be considered that while most criminal activities are threatening – which is, after 
all, why the acts were criminalised in the first place – the harmfulness of the crimes themselves 
varies widely by social group and by region. Of course, if an unauthorised immigrant were to 
use a false identity to carry out a terrorist attack or other major crimes, then the collateral costs 
to the UK would indeed be huge. However, that would also be true of ‘home-grown criminals’ 
committing the same acts. It would therefore generally be a mistake to focus on individual 
incidents, though some ‘signal crimes’ can have a symbolic effect in transforming political 
assessments of harm which, in turn, motivates action at the political level and in society more 
widely.18 Instead, decision-makers must determine at what frequency and level of seriousness 
organised-crime acts become a threat to national security or to some other important interest 
(be it social values or economic interests). Thus, for some Scandinavian countries, ‘biker 
gangs’ are seen as an existential threat, not just because they may prominently deal in drugs 
and intimidate people, but also because they serve as a visible symbol of state weakness and of 
public incivility.  
 
 
Organising Crimes 
Undoubtedly, a high level of organisation within a criminal group gives economies of scale: it 
reduces the time needed to search for co-offenders and integrates, both horizontally and 
vertically, all of the functional elements in crimes. There is also a reputational benefit in 
controlling competitors and credibility gained from having a fearsome reputation, so that 
criminal actors do not have to use violence often in extortion or in seeing off rivals. However, 
the disadvantages of such a reputation – of being  a recognised ‘criminal organisation’ – include 
both the likelihood of attracting more counter-measures from those more capable states that are 
determined to confront  it as a threat, and the difficulty of transplanting operations elsewhere.19  
 
Two other factors that impede or facilitate the rate of growth of particular forms of crime 
collectively performed by the group or network are ‘conscious opponents’ and existing levels 
of crime networks and organisations. Most of the tasks that need to be performed to commit 
serious crimes over a long period can be as easily accomplished at a local level as 
transnationally, except where it may be necessary to import required goods or assets (as in non-
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hydroponic or synthetic drugs or illicit labour) or it is desirable that they are imported (as with 
prostitutes from particular regions or some counterfeit or genuine but smuggled products). 
These tasks are:  
to obtain finance for crime; to find people willing and technically or socially competent to 
commit crimes (though this may not always be necessary); to obtain the equipment and 
transportation necessary to commit the crimes; to convert, where necessary, products of crime 
into money or other usable assets; to find people willing to store proceeds (and perhaps conceal 
their origin);  and to neutralise law enforcement by technical skill, by corruption or legal 
arbitrage, using legal obstacles to enforcement operations and prosecutions, which vary 
between states. 
 
Through analysis of the dynamics of particular crimes and criminal careers, these procedural 
elements can be broken down further into much more concrete steps or ‘scripts’, which can 
be viewed as an attribute both of individuals and of networks and groups.  
 
Although it is a difficult task to map ‘organised crime’ – due to the definitional ambiguity 
outlined above – the recent Home Office national data derived from the Organised Crime 
Group Mapping exercise is illuminating about variations in organised crime within the UK, 
though where suspected organised criminals live and primarily operate does not limit the 
areas that are affected by their actions.20  
 
 
 
The second body of evidence from which conclusions about the prevalence and reach of 
organised crime can be drawn relates to violence. In southern Italy, homicides and threats by 
organised criminals might be commonplace (though, as in Colombia, rates can vary 
substantially over time). Meanwhile, a British study concluded that about 6 per cent of criminal 
homicides in England and Wales in 2005–06 had some form of link to organised crime.21 Of 
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the 696 cases reviewed, fifty-four were likely linked to the activities of organised criminal 
groups, and of these, seventeen were directly caused by groups with a distinct organisational 
structure. Those cases with such links were far more likely to remain ‘undetected’ by police in 
comparison with homicides overall. Of note, the aggregate level of criminal homicide has 
declined significantly in recent years across most European countries. This raises further 
interesting questions about whether such decline means that violence associated with serious 
organised crime has been declining too, at least in terms of the number of actual fatalities rather 
than threats; or whether organised-crime homicides are proving more resistant to reduction, 
and hence form a greater proportion of those cases that do happen. 
 
Among the EU member states, Italy, Belgium and Bulgaria top the figures for per capita 
homicides by firearm, with Italy also ranked highest in terms of the absolute number. England 
and Wales has one of the lowest per capita rates of gun-related homicide in Europe, but the 
absence of studies on organised crime related gun homicides elsewhere should induce caution: 
guns are also used in family homicides. Taking its figure of 6 per cent of homicides being 
linked to organised crime as an average rate for Europe, and using EU homicide data for 2010, 
this would imply conservatively some 500 organised-crime-related homicides in the EU. 
However, because such violence is unevenly distributed, the rates in some jurisdictions are 
significantly higher (and conversely lower in others).22  The professional consensus is that 
criminal markets give rise, to far less actual violence than people generally believe, and that 
homicide and other serious violence is normally a result of unstable personalities and market 
incursions by outsiders. Outside Italy, Mafia-type large scale organised crime is rare in the EU:  
looser SME-type affiliations are far more widespread. 
 
 
Intervening Against Organised Crimes 
One unfortunate unintended effect of using the term ‘organised crime’ is to freeze the activities 
and the set of people carrying them out within a somewhat static framework, when a proper 
risk analysis would emphasise the dynamics of crime opportunities and inter-offender 
relationships. The credibility and value of organised-crime ‘assessments’ is not improved by 
the tendency of reports always to speak of globalisation making things worse by smoothing the 
diversification of crime networks. In fact, it can become more difficult to successfully commit 
crimes (such as payment card fraud after the introduction of Chip and PIN, or the ‘heroin 
drought’ in relatively isolated Australia) and, indeed, the value of criminal investments can 
also go down (as with legitimate investments).23 This complexity – and the mixed fortunes of 
organised-crime groups – should be borne in mind when seeking to put a stop to organised 
criminal activity. 
 
It is true that some ‘rogue’ or ‘collapsed’ states are too weak or corrupted to deal with crime 
entrepreneurs and political rebels in their midst, while some corrupt strong politicians 
(caudillos) positively embrace organised criminals (including fraudsters like the now de-
knighted Sir Allen Stanford) provided that they get what they consider to be an appropriate 
‘cut’.24 Technically, then, they become part of an organised crime group/racketeering 
conspiracy – but who in their jurisdiction will prosecute them? 
 
Meanwhile, with regard to those countries that are willing and able to try to counter the 
proliferation of such groups and actors, anti-crime measures may be subordinated to wider 
foreign and economic policy interests, reducing intervention opportunities as a result. 
However, a number of approaches are possible to mitigate the problems caused by organised-
crime groups and networks. Private electronic communications between non-terrorist offenders 
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may be intercepted by the intelligence agencies, although the resources (and sometimes the 
motivation) to act on such intelligence are limited and it may be too problematic to protect 
intelligence sources in the criminal-justice arena, thereby discouraging their use for 
prosecution. In addition, political factors may influence preferences for action. The formation 
in the UK of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in 2006 was a brave attempt to turn 
away from the action-orientation approach adopted in most countries, in creating a body that 
was focused more on intelligence collection and strategic intervention, predicated on greater 
thought than is usual for such bodies about the prospective impacts of both criminal and 
civil/administrative interventions by police and non-police agencies on the organisation and 
levels of crime.25 This was, and remains, a transformational concept, but critics – including 
those in government – contend that SOCA failed to communicate intervention impacts on 
levels of harm adequately and that its activities failed to generate headlines frequently enough. 
There are lessons to be learned from the experiences of SOCA, before its closure in 2013, about 
‘satisficing’ a broad range of stakeholders and about the difficulties of sustaining long-term 
timescales in a shorter-term political environment.  
 
The diversity of means available to governments in attempting to reduce the impact of 
organised impacts is nicely exemplified in the ‘4 Ps model’. There is undoubtedly some overlap 
in goals between ‘Prepare’, ‘Protect’, ‘Prevent’ and ‘Pursue’: even Pursue is intended to have 
a preventative effect as well as achieving better justice. In an era when – as a RAND Europe 
study put it – ‘criminal organisations operate as “polymorphous criminal networks”, 
responding to changes in their markets by looking for alternative – licit and illicit – ways to 
secure their position and income’,26 the risks arising from siloed approaches to intervention 
based on a narrow range of illicit activities are clear. It may often be appropriate to prosecute 
a target for a fraud or money-laundering offence rather than for drugs, violence or human 
trafficking; and it may often be appropriate to intervene through non-criminal-justice methods 
such as refusing licensing as ‘a fit and proper person’ in order to the reduce market power of 
particularly dangerous groups, even where such interventions may have little identifiable effect 
on drugs availability, price and purity. (Though care needs to be taken lest the intervention 
leads to reduced purity/higher toxicity or to more violence as other groups jockey to replace 
the disrupted/imprisoned ones.) In general, whatever their symbolic value for motivation and 
for headlines, Mr Big or Kingpin strategies of going after the imputed Head of an Organised 
Crime Group have not proven to be very effective in reducing illegal markets anywhere in the 
world, but one needs a mix of approaches for different crimes and for different forms of 
organisation. Furthermore, when choosing a strategy appropriate to the nature of the group and 
crime involved, it should also be remembered that localised ‘gang crime’ can produce major 
harms locally, without having the sort of regional or greater reach that would normally attract 
the attention of the National Crime Agency in the UK, for example. Furthermore, even small 
local groups can often require extensive and invasive policing operations to “take them on”: 
often a local response is not qualified to undertake these responses. The provision of an 
undercover officer can be outside the capability of many forces, and almost certainly most local 
command units. 
 
 
Final Thoughts 
This article has showed the complexity and variegation of harm and threat judgments, without 
disputing that organised crimes and the networks involved are a threat to economic interests 
and to human security in the UK and, indeed, in many other countries. Deconstructed, few 
individual elements of organised crime constitute a national-security threat; the extent to which 
both the criminal actors and the impact of their crimes in their totality represent a threat to 
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national security also remains contested. Yet one must consider the counterfactual scenarios – 
that is, if no or different controls were in place. Furthermore, the actual range and impact of 
criminal activities are influenced by their organisational context and contacts, motivation, skills 
and by the situational opportunities offered by both the private and public sectors. Meanwhile, 
some groups of criminal actors have national and even international ambitions; others have 
plans only for local activity and would not wish to move outside of their comfort zones either 
geographically or in terms of types of crime; others still transition in their ambitions, as their 
criminal careers and contacts develop. Indeed, it is important to note that except where mafias 
are already in place, nearly all ‘serious players’ were once minor ‘criminal upcomers’ who, if 
their potential was accurately identified, might be subjected to interventions. In short, local and 
regional intimidation can and does occur; criminal activities (including fraud) occur both 
nationally and transnationally; and countermeasures are needed to monitor and to inhibit their 
growth.  
 
The UK government’s new Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, published in October 2013, 
offers some fresh perspectives, but key challenges include how to assess effectiveness – 
differentiated from efficiency – and how to translate strategy into practice at the local and 
regional as well as at the international level. Inter-agency and public–private partnerships hold 
the key, but it is also important to clarify what the outputs and outcomes are for different 
criminal sectors. In the UK, the dialogue between and within the public and private sectors – a 
formal policy mechanism – rests upon a high level of inter-sectoral trust and data-sharing 
provisions for the prevention of crime, but this may not be easy to transfer elsewhere for both 
cultural and legal reasons. Even in the UK, co-operation to reduce the prevalence and impact 
of organised crime is inhibited by differences in formal performance objectives, culture and 
even personalities, regardless of the formal cooperation structures in place. Inter-sectoral 
competition for scarce resources would occur even if egos and personal interests did not get in 
the way. Measuring (if only roughly) the diverse set of harms and threats, working out the 
relationship between the resources (both public and private) available, and assessing the likely 
impacts of those resources is – and will – remain a huge challenge around the globe. Managing 
the problems down is an important security objective. 
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Notes 
 
1 If the money does not pass through their accounts, then it might be questioned whether it has been laundered 
rather than just hidden: criminal law might consider the two options to be the same, but the term ‘laundering’ 
usually confers a sense of formalised process, as in the somewhat outdated, three-part placement-laundering-
integration cycle that viewed in international circles as a core model of money laundering. By contrast, an 
income that is liable to tax and is not declared to tax authorities, for example, has not been laundered – that is, 
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